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Abstract
We study the single-choice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler is given access to samples.
We show that the optimal competitive ratio of 1/2 can be achieved with a single sample from each
distribution. When the distributions are identical, we show that for any constant ε > 0, O(n)
samples from the distribution suffice to achieve the optimal competitive ratio (≈ 0.745) within
(1 + ε), resolving an open problem of [9].
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1 Introduction
Consider the classic single-choice Prophet Inequality problem. Oﬄine, there are n distribu-
tions D1, . . . ,Dn presented to a gambler. For i = 1 to n, a random variable Xi is drawn
independently from Di and revealed online. The gambler must then decide immediately and
irrevocably whether to accept Xi (and achieve reward Xi, ending the game), or reject Xi
(continuing the game, but never revisiting Xi again). The goal of the gambler is to devise a
stopping rule which maximizes their expected reward. The performance of potential stopping
rules is typically measured by their competitive ratio in comparison to a prophet (who knows
all Xi in advance and achieves expected reward E[maxi{Xi}]). Typically, prophet inequalities
are designed assuming that the distributions presented oﬄine are fully known. This paper
focuses on the setting where the gambler is instead presented with oﬄine samples from the
Di, rather than complete knowledge.
In the classic setting, seminal work of Krengel and Sucheston provides a strategy guar-
anteeing a competitive ratio of 1/2, which is the best possible [22].1 Samuel-Cahn later
proved that simply setting a threshold equal to the median of maxi{Xi} (i.e. a value T such
that Pr[maxi{Xi} > v] = 1/2) also achieves the optimal competitive ratio of 1/2 [25], and
1 To see that no better than 1/2 is possible, consider an instance where X1 is deterministically 1, and
X2 is 1/ε with probability ε, and 0 otherwise. The prophet achieves 2− ε (taking X2 when it is large,
and X1 otherwise), while the gambler achieves only 1 (they must decide whether to take X1 without
knowing if X2 is large).
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it was later shown that a threshold of E[maxi{Xi}]/2 suffices as well [21]. These last two
thresholds are remarkably simple, but certainly require a non-trivial number of samples to
estimate well.
Our first result establishes that a single sample from each Di suffices to achieve the
optimal competitive ratio of 1/2. The algorithm is also exceptionally simple: if X˜1, . . . , X˜n
denote independent samples from D1, . . . ,Dn, simply set maxi{X˜i} as a threshold.
I Definition 1 (Single Sample Algorithm). Given as input X˜1, . . . , X˜n, set a threshold T =
maxi{X˜i} and accept the first random variable exceeding T .
I Theorem 2. The Single Sample Algorithm guarantees a competitive ratio of 1/2.
A subsequent line of works considers the special case where each Di is identical (which
we’ll refer to as D). Here, work of Hill and Kertz provided the first improved competitive
ratio (of 1− 1/e) [19], and this was recently improved to the optimal competitive ratio of
α ≈ 0.745 [10]. Our second result establishes that a linear number of samples from D suffices
to achieve the optimal competitive ratio, up to ε. Since our algorithm simply replaces the
quantile-based thresholds of [10] with samples, we call it Samples-CFHOV (the five authors
of [10]). The algorithm and analysis are fairly simple and we provide a formal description in
Section 4.
I Theorem 3. With O(n/ε6) samples, Samples-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of
α−O(ε).
1.1 Related Work
Over the past decade, prophet inequalities have been studied from numerous angles within the
TCS community [7, 3, 21, 17, 15, 23, 16, 24, 12, 14, 6, 2, 11, 4, 18, 13, 8]. All of these works
assume explicit knowledge of the given distributions. The limited prior work most related
to ours considers sample access to the underlying distributions. On this front, Azar et al.
consider prophet inequalities subject to combinatorial constraints, and establish that limited
samples suffice to obtain constant competitive ratios in many settings [5]. In comparison to
this work, our paper considers only optimal competitive ratios, and the simple single-choice
setting.
In the i.i.d. model (each value is drawn from the same D), a (1− 1/e)-approximation was
first shown in [19], and recent work achieved the same guarantee with n− 1 samples from
D [9]. This ratio was later improved to ≈ 0.738 [1], and then to α ≈ 0.745 [10], where α is
the optimal achievable competitive ratio [19, 20]. The most related work in this sequence to
ours is [9], who establish that a competitive ratio of α− ε is achievable with O(n2) samples
(for any constant ε), and that Ω(n) samples are necessary. They also establish a formal
barrier to achieving α− ε with o(n2) samples. In comparison, we circumvent their barrier to
achieve a competitive ratio of α− ε with O(n) samples, resolving one of their open problems.
Roadmap
In Section 2, we provide brief preliminaries. Section 3 contains our 2-approximation with a
single sample. Section 4 contains our (α− ε)-approximation with linearly many samples.
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2 Preliminaries
There are n distributions, D1, . . . ,Dn. Online, a gambler sees a random variable Xi drawn
from Di one at a time, and must immediately and irrevocably decide whether to accept (and
get reward Xi) or reject (and see Xi+1, throwing away Xi forever). Strategies for a gambler
are often termed stopping rules, and the competitive ratio of a stopping rule is the worst-case
ratio (over all possible n, and D1, . . . ,Dn) between its expected reward and E[maxi{Xi}].
Our algorithms will not have knowledge of any Di, but instead will have access to samples.
Our algorithms will treat these samples as the only oﬄine input, and decide whether to
accept or reject an element based only on the value of that element and the samples.2 Here,
we will count the number of samples from each distribution as our sample complexity.
We will also consider the i.i.d. setting, where each Di = D. Here, we will count the total
number of samples from D as our sample complexity. In this setting, we will let α ≈ 0.745
denote the optimal competitive ratio for an algorithm with knowledge of D.
Continuous versus Discrete Random Variables
All of our algorithm definitions are straight-forward for continuous distributions. For
distributions with point masses, the following “reduction” to continuous is needed. Instead of
thinking of D as a single-variate distribution, we will (overload notation and) think of D as
a bivariate distribution with the first coordinate drawn from D, and the second “tie-breaker”
coordinate drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 1]. Then (X1, t1) > (X2, t2) if either
X1 > X2, or X1 = X2 and t1 > t2. Observe that because the tie-breaker coordinate is
continuous, the probability of having (X1, t1) = (X2, t2) for any two values during a run of
any algorithm is zero. Therefore, if we define FD(X, t) := Pr(Y,u)←(D,U([0,1]))[(Y, u) < (X, t)],
we have that FD(X, t) < FD(Y, u) ⇔ (X, t) < (Y, u). We will not explicitly reference this
tie-breaker random variable in the definition of our algorithms, but simply refer to X ← D
as the pair (X, t).
Adversaries
Prophet Inequalities are typically studied against an oﬄine adversary. That is, the adversary
simply picks the distributions D1, . . . ,Dn (and their indices), which is all presented to the
gambler oﬄine. Some prophet inequalities hold against the stronger almighty adversary,
which selects the set of distributions {D1, . . . ,Dn} oﬄine, then decides in which order to
reveal the random variables X1, . . . , Xn based on their realization. Note that previous
competitive ratios of 1/2 in the non-i.i.d. setting hold against an almighty adversary, and
Theorem 2 does as well. Previous competitive ratios of α in the i.i.d. setting hold against
the oﬄine adversary (and are impossible to achieve against the almighty adversary), so
Theorem 3 holds against the oﬄine adversary as well.
3 The Non-I.I.D. Case: Optimal Ratio with a Single Sample From Di
The Single Sample Algorithm proceeds as follows. It takes as input X˜i drawn independently
from each Di, sets a threshold T = maxi{X˜i}, and accepts the first element exceeding T .
Our goal in this section is to prove Theorem 2 that this algorithm obtains 12 the reward, in
expectation, of the omniscient prophet that always selects the highest value.
2 In principle, sample-based algorithms might also consider previously viewed elements, but our algorithms
don’t.
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Our analysis will use the principle of deferred decisions: instead of first drawing the
samples X˜, and then revealing the actual draws X, we will jointly draw 2n samples
Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, and then for each i randomly decide which of {Yi, Zi} is equal to X˜i
and which is equal to Xi. Formally, consider the following Deferred-Decisions procedure for
drawing X, X˜:
1. Draw Y1, . . . , Yn and Z1, . . . , Zn independently each from D1, . . . ,Dn.
2. For ease of notation later, for all i, relabel so that Yi > Zi.
3. Independently, flip n fair coins. If coin i is heads, set Xi := Yi and X˜i := Zi. Otherwise,
set Xi := Zi and X˜i := Yi.
I Observation 4. The output of the Deferred-Decisions procedure correctly generates
X˜1, . . . , X˜n and X1, . . . , Xn as independent draws from D1, . . . ,Dn.
Our analysis will proceed by directly comparing, for any fixed Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, the
expected reward of the gambler over the randomness in the coin flips of step three to the
expected reward of the prophet over the randomness in the coin flips of step three. We note
that this analysis is similar to that of the rehearsal algorithm of [5] for k-uniform matroids
(whose competitive ratio is asymptotically optimal for large k), and that prior to this it was
folklore knowledge that the Single Sample Algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of at least
1/4. The novelty in our analysis is precisely nailing down the tight competitive ratio.
3.1 Analysis Setup
For a fixed Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, sort the values into descending order, and relabel them as
W1, . . . ,W2n. If Wj is equal to Yi (or Zi), we say that Wj comes from i, and denote this
with index(Wj) = i. Call the pivotal index j∗ the minimum j such that there exists an ` > j
with index(W`) = index(Wj). That is, the pivotal index j∗ is such that there are exactly
j∗ − 1 Y random variables exceeding the largest Z random variable.
Our analysis will make use of the following concept: for each W1, . . . ,Wj∗−1, let Cj
denote the outcome of the coinflip for index(Wj) (which assigns either Yi or Zi to arrive as
a sample and the other to arrive as a real value). Observe, importantly, that the random
variables C1, . . . , Cj∗−1 are independent (because they are independent coin flips for different
indices). Also importantly, observe that the random variable Cj∗ is deterministic conditioned
on C1, . . . , Cj∗−1 (because it is exactly the same coin flip as one of the earlier indices).
3.2 The Prophet’s Expected Reward
I Proposition 5. For fixed W1, . . . ,W2n and pivotal index j∗, the prophet’s expected reward,
over the randomness in the coin flips of step three, is
∑j∗−1
j=1 Wj/2j +Wj∗/2j
∗−1.
Proof. Observe that the prophet achieves expected reward equal to maxi{Xi}, so we just
want to compute the probability that this is W1, . . . ,W2n. For each j < j∗, Wj is equal to
maxi{Xi} if and only if Cj is heads, and C` is tails for all ` < j (recall that all Wj ’s are Y
random variables for j < j∗). Because each of the coin flips are independent, this occurs
with probability precisely 1/2j .
For j∗, Wj∗ is equal to maxi{Xi} if and only if C` is tails for all ` < j∗, and coin Cj∗ is
tails. Observe, however, that by definition of the pivotal index j∗, that when C` is tails for
all ` < j∗ we have Cj∗ as tails as well (because it is the same coin as one of the first j∗ − 1).
Therefore, whenever all of the first j∗− 1 coins are tails, maxi{Xi} = Wj∗ (and this happens
with probability 1/2j∗−1).
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As the first j∗−1 coins either contain some heads, or are all tails (and we have counted the
prophet’s reward in all such cases), we have now fully accounted for the prophet’s expected
reward over the randomness in the coin flips. J
3.3 The Single Sample Algorithm’s Expected Reward
I Proposition 6. For fixed W1, . . . ,W2n and pivotal index j∗, the gambler’s expected reward,
over the randomness in the coin flips of step three, is at least
∑j∗−2
j=1 Wj/2j+1 +Wj∗−1/2j
∗−1.
Proof. Consider the case where C1 is tails. In this case, the gambler gets no reward because
the threshold is higher than all revealed elements. For j < j∗ − 1, consider next the case
where C1, . . . , Cj are heads, but Cj+1 is tails. In this case, the gambler gets reward at least
Wj (because the gambler will accept the first non-sample random variable exceeding Wj+1,
and these random variables have values W1, . . . ,Wj). The probability that this occurs is
exactly 1/2j+1.
Consider also the case where C1, . . . , Cj∗−1 are all heads. Then the threshold is set atWj∗ ,
and the gambler will get at least Wj∗−1. This occurs with probability exactly 1/2j
∗−1. J
3.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We can immediately see that:
j∗−2∑
j=1
Wj/2j+1 +Wj∗−1/2j
∗−1 ≥
j∗−1∑
j=1
Wj/2j+1 +Wj∗/2j
∗
= 12 ·
j∗−1∑
j=1
Wj/2j +Wj∗/2j
∗−1
 .
By Propositions 5 and 6, the right-hand side is exactly half the prophet’s expected reward,
conditioned on W1, . . . ,W2n and j∗, and the left-hand side is exactly the gambler’s expected
reward (again conditioned onW1, . . . ,W2n and j∗). As the gambler achieves half the prophet’s
expected reward for all W1, . . . ,W2n and j∗, the guarantee holds in expectation as well. J
4 The I.I.D. Case: Optimal Ratio with Linear Samples From D
We begin with a brief overview of the algorithm from [10] and its main features, followed by
a formal specification of our algorithm.
4.1 Overview of [10] and Samples-CFHOV
The algorithm of [10] (with one slight modification due to [9]) proceeds as follows. We’ll
refer to this algorithm as Explicit-CFHOV.
1. As a function only of n, and independently of D, define monotone increasing probabilities
0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . pn ≤ 1.
2. For all i such that pi ≤ δ = ε2/n, update pi := 0 (this is the [9] modification).
3. Accept Xi if and only if FD(Xi) > 1− pi. Observe that this is identical to accepting Xi if
and only if Xi > σi = F−1D (1− pi). Also observe that Xi exceeds σi with probability pi.
I Theorem 7 ([10, 9]). In the i.i.d. setting, Explicit-CFHOV has competitive ratio α− ε.3
3 Without step two, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of α.
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That is, Explicit-CFHOV sets, for each i ∈ [n], a probability pi independent of D, and
sets a threshold σi for accepting Xi which is exceeded with probability exactly pi.
If instead of explicit access to D, we’re given m i.i.d. samples from D, the challenge
is simply that we can no longer compute FD(Xi) exactly and run Explicit-CFHOV. The
algorithm of [9] observes that m = O(n2) samples suffices to estimate the quantiles sufficiently
well. Our algorithm observes that in fact m = O(n) samples suffice (which is asymptotically
tight, by a lower bound in [9]). Our algorithm proceeds as follows, which we call Samples-
CFHOV.
1. As a function only of n, and independently of D, define monotone increasing
probabilities 0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . pn ≤ 1, exactly as in Explicit-CFHOV.
2. Round down each pi to the nearest integer power of (1 + ε); we denote the rounded value
by bpic ∈ {(1 + ε)−1, (1 + ε)−2 . . . }.
3. Set p˜i := bpic/(1 + ε) (that is, we have rounded down each pi, then further divided by
(1 + ε)).
4. From our m samples, let τi denote the value of the (p˜i ·m)-th highest sample.
5. Accept Xi if and only if Xi > τi.
That is, Samples-CFHOV provides an estimate τi of σi via the m samples. Intuitively,
we are trying to overestimate σi so that it is unlikely that Samples-CFHOV will ever choose
to accept an element that Explicit-CFHOV would not. We’ll prove Theorem 3 as a corollary
of Theorem 8:
I Theorem 8. For any distribution D, with m = O(n/ε6) samples, the expected value
achieved by Samples-CFHOV is at least a (1−O(ε))-fraction of that of Explicit-CFHOV.
We briefly remark that our proof of Theorem 8 actually holds for any choice of pi’s (all
/∈ (0, δ)). That is, if Explicit-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of γ(~p) with a particular
choice of ~p, Samples-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of γ(~p)−O(ε) (as long as each
pi /∈ (0, δ)).
4.2 Brief Comparison to [9]
The algorithm employed by [9] using O(n2) samples is conceptually similar in that they
also wish to set thresholds τi such that FD(τi) ≈ 1 − pi. The main difference is that we
target a multiplicative (1− ε)-approximation to each, whereas they target an additive 1/n-
approximation for each threshold. That is, they aim to ensure that for each pi, the threshold
τi has |FD(τi) − pi| ≤ 1/n. They prove, using the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz Inequality,
that O(n2) samples suffice for this, then further argue that these small additive errors in the
CDF don’t cost much.
The same paper also establishes a barrier to moving beyond Ω(n2) samples. Specifically,
they establish that Ω(n2) samples are necessarily just to guarantee for a single i with pi ≈ 1/2
that |FD(τi)− pi| ≤ 1/n. Our approach circumvents this bound by seeking a significantly
weaker guarantee for such i (only that |FD(τi)− pi| ≤ O(εpi) – see Equation (1)). So the
two key differences in our approach is (a) we show that O(n) samples suffice to learn the
thresholds up to a multiplicative (1 + ε) error in the CDF and (b) establishing that this
(significantly weaker) estimation suffices for a good approximation.
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 8
Our proof breaks down into two simple claims. The first establishes that with high probability,
our sample-based thresholds are “good.” The second establishes that “good” thresholds yield
a good approximation. Below, recall that δ = ε2/n.
I Lemma 9. With m = 12 ln(1/ε)/(ε3δ) = O(n/ε6) samples, with probability at least 1− ε,
we have that for every i (simultaneously),
pi
(1 + ε)3 ≤ Prx∼D[x > τi] ≤ pi. (1)
Note that Equation (1) does not reference the values of the actual elements X1, . . . , Xn
at all – it is just a claim about the thresholds ~τ being set. That is, the probability 1 − ε
is taken only over the randomness in drawing the samples (and in particular independent
of the values of the actual elements). We will call a set of thresholds “good” if they satisfy
Equation (1).
Proof. Recall that τi is set by first rounding down pi to bpic, then further dividing by (1 + ε)
to p˜i, then set equal to the (p˜i ·m)-th highest of m samples. To proceed, let Li be such that
Pr
x∼D
[x > Li] = bpic.
Similarly, let Hi be such that
Pr
x∼D
[x > Hi] = (1 + ε)−2bpic.
Then (1) certainly holds whenever Li < τi < Hi. The remainder of the proof establishes that
we are likely to have Li < τi < Hi for all i.
Indeed, observe that we expect to see bpicm samples greater than Li. We say that bpic
is bad if the number of samples greater than Li is not in the range
[
(1 + ε)−1(bpicm), (1 +
ε)(bpicm)
]
. Note that whenever neither bpic nor (1 + ε)−2bpic is bad, then we indeed have
Li < τi < Hi.
Because the number of samples greater than p is an average of m independent {0, 1}
random variables with expectation p, the multiplicative Chernoff bound implies that the the
probability that a particular p is bad is upper bounded by:
Pr[p is bad] < e−ε
2pm/3.
If all p ∈ {(1 + ε)−1, . . . , δ} are not bad, then our desired claim holds. Taking union
bound over this (1 + ε)-multiplicative net, we have that the probability that some p ∈
{(1 + ε)−1, (1 + ε)−2 . . . , δ} is bad is bounded by:
O(ln(1/δ)/ε)∑
i=0
e−ε
2(1−ε)−iδm/3 ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−ε
2(1−ε)−iδm/3 ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−ε
3iδm/6 ≤ e−ε3δm/12
Above, the first term is simply a union bound over all p in this net. The second inequality
follows as (1− ε)−i ≥ εi/2 for all ε ∈ (0, 1) and i ≥ 0. The final inequality holds (at least)
when m ≥ 6/(ε3δ). Therefore, setting m = 12 ln(1/ε)/(ε3δ) satisfies the desired claim. J
Next, we wish to show that whenever the thresholds are “good”, the algorithm performs
well in expectation. Below, let t1 denote the stopping time of Explicit-CFHOV (i.e. the
random variable denoting the element it chooses to accept), and let t2 denote the stopping
time of Samples-CFHOV.
ITCS 2020
60:8 Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples
B Claim 10. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, t2 ≥ t1. That is, Samples-CFHOV
selects an element later than Explicit-CFHOV.
Proof. For every i, we have that by (1), the threshold used by Samples-CFHOV is at least
the threshold used by Explicit-CFHOV. Therefore, the first time they deviate (if any) is
when Explicit-CFHOV accepts an element but Samples-CFHOV does not. C
I Lemma 11. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, the following holds for every v:
Pr[Xt2 > v] ≥
1
(1 + ε)3 Pr[Xt1 > v]. (2)
Proof. We prove that (2) holds uniformly for every i ∈ [n], i.e.
Pr[(Xt2 > v) ∧ (t2 = i)] ≥
1
(1 + ε)3 Pr[(Xt1 > v) ∧ (t1 = i)]. (3)
The event (Xtb > v) ∧ (tb = i) (for either b ∈ {1, 2}) occurs if and only if the corresponding
algorithm doesn’t stop before i, and Xi is larger than both v and the threshold set (by
the corresponding algorithm). Of course, whether or not an algorithm stops before i is
completely independent of Xi. We claim that the following holds on the probability that the
two algorithms accept Xi (conditioned on making it to Xi). Intuitively, Claim 12 establishes
that, even though the threshold τi is stricter than σi, we are still roughly as likely to accept
an Xi exceeding v using τi versus σi, for all v.
B Claim 12. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, then for every v and i such that pi ≥ δ:
(1 + ε)3 Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] ≥ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)].
Proof. We consider the following three cases: perhaps v > τi, or perhaps v ∈ (σi, τi), or
perhaps v < σi. We claim that the following three inequalities hold:
v ≥ τi ⇒
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] = Pr[Xi > v] = Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)].
v ∈ (σi,τi)⇒
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)] ≤ Pr[Xi > σi] ≤ Pr[Xi > τi](1 + ε)3 =
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)]
(1 + ε)3 .
v < σi ⇒
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)] = Pr[Xi > σi] ≤ Pr[Xi > τi](1 + ε)3 =
Pr[(Xi > τi) ∧ (Xi > v)]
(1 + ε)3 .
Indeed, the first implication follows as v exceeds both σi and τi. The second implication
follows as v > σi, and then by condition (1). The third implication follows from condition (1).
C
Claim 12 is the heart of the proof, and we can now wrap up. Observe that Pr[(Xt2 >
v) ∧ (t2 = i)] = Pr[t2 ≥ i] · Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)]. Similarly, Pr[(Xt1 > v) ∧ (t1 = i)] =
Pr[t1 ≥ i] ·Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)]. By the work above, (1 + ε)3 Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] ≥
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)]. By Claim 10, Pr[t2 ≥ i] ≥ Pr[t1 ≥ i]. Therefore, we’ve proven the
desired claim for every i ∈ [n]. As Pr[Xtb > v] =
∑
i Pr[(Xtb > v) ∧ (tb = i)], this completes
the proof of Lemma 11. J
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Proof of Theorem 8. The proof of Theorem 8 now follows as a direct corollary of Lemmas 9
and 11. Lemma 11 asserts that whenever the thresholds are “good”, Samples-CFHOV
achieves at least a 1/(1 + ε)3 fraction of the expected reward of Explicit-CFHOV (this is
because the expected reward of Samples-CFHOV is simply
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt2 > v]dv ≥
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt1 >
v]dv/(1 + ε)3, and the expected reward of Explicit-CFHOV is precisely
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt2 > v]dv).
Lemma 9 asserts that the thresholds are good with probability at least 1− ε. So together,
Samples-CFHOV achieves at least a 1−ε(1+ε)3 of the expected reward of Explicit-CFHOV. J
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